The strategies of mainstream and challenger parties in the government-opposition game: the case of Spain

This paper analyses whether the economic crisis has strengthened the consensus seeking behaviour of the Spanish opposition parties, or by the contrary it has increased a conflictive strategy. Contrary to previous research, the analysis is based on a novel database that includes information about the final vote for legislation and the amending activity of parliamentary groups in the Spanish parliament for the period 2000-2015. Results illustrate that the crisis has reinforced conflict in parliament but party’s responses to economic downturn vary between mainstream and challenger parties. Mainstream opposition parties with government aspirations behave in a more consensual way than challengers that are more likely to be excluded from power. In their opposition strategies, challengers mainly rely on passive and relatively costless forms of opposition, like return amendments and negative vote for legislation. Mainstream follow a more problem solving oriented strategy, using their parliamentary resources to present alternatives to the policies introduced by the incumbent, like amendments with alternative text proposals.