The proposal deals with the implementation of democratic control in three CEE countries: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. These States were chosen for the analysis because they were all involved in a democratic transition after the collapse of USSR and wanted to join the Euro-Atlantic organizations. However these common factors did not create a common canvas to enforce democratic control over the military forces.
To understand these differences, the proposal argues that the process of controlling the armies was mainly due to endogenous dynamics. Here the choice of a comparative analysis is particularly interesting as it shows the specificities of each path and how they were influenced by the heritage of communism and the local configurations. Hence these examples lead us to reject the transitologic paradigm as well as the assumption that NATO did play a major socializing role. What’s more this case study demonstrates that the implementation of democratic control is not only guaranteed by a strong Parliament but also by an executive that understands the necessity to have an apolitical army. Finally, it will be argued that the concept of democratic control can create some ambiguities and misperceptions as it may be confused with civil control. This issue was particularly salient in CEE countries as the Warsaw pact was characterized by civil control.
The paper will be based on archives, memories and interviews with key actors.
