Walter Hallstein played a major role in creating and setting up the Commission’s administration as well as designing central parts of the CAP. Jacques Delors led the initiative of the SEA as well as the creation of the European single currency. More recently, José Barroso influenced the launch of the Lisbon Treaty and gained attention for reshaping the Commission’s administration. These observations illustrate that although the Commission presidency is not expected, from the EU political system, to produce strong leaders, these leaders have nonetheless emerged over time. An office with few direct powers does not automatically imply weak leadership. Moreover, while any incumbent strongly relies on informal authority and agreement building, the Commission presidency appears particularly attractive for the analysis of these more ‘hidden’ processes of influence. It follows that leadership does therefore not only consist of the formal authority of an office, but that it entails a more relational and complex concept of political interaction.
Based on my ongoing PhD research project about the Commission presidency and leadership performance in the EU, this paper analyzes how the leadership performance of the three mentioned presidents in different contexts over time can be explained, in particular by focusing on their capacity to design EU policies. Leadership is an abstract concept within social interaction. It is a contextual process involving leaders, followers, and context. The general basis for the analysis of leadership is that both leaders and their environment equally affect and determine the opportunities and constraints of leaders and thus the process and outcome of leadership performance. From a conceptual perspective, the paper examines biographical and political backgrounds of these presidents as well as the formal and informal resources at their disposal. Its goal is to develop a methodological model for the comparative analysis of leadership performance at supranational level.
