Beginning in the 1980s many western welfare states have undergone two significant and related changes. Firstly, as a way to counteract what has been experienced as problem with public inefficiency, private service providers began to be introduced within the welfare system. This has come to arrange the public sector in accordance with private sector logic internal markets was created, so called “quasi-markets”. Secondly and quite simultaneously, the general policy of many welfare systems begun to be more oriented towards ‘activation’. Put short, this involves that focus is directed towards obligations and duties of the individual for self being responsible to gather and choose welfare services. This study examines public steering within a reform that is particularly typical in relation to the abovementioned trends. In 2010 the Swedish Government initiated an ‘establishment reform’ that is directed towards newly arrived refugees. This reform follows the logic of quasi markets and includes significant traits of involvement of private enterprises as well as being an excellent example of an activation policy. A typical feature of individualized responsibility is the possibility for immigrants to themselves choose an ‘introduction guide’, from a private enterprise, that should assist them in getting established in society. Whereas previous research have pointed out problems with accountability, goal conflicts, limited competition and public management capacity within this type of structure, forms for steering have not been as emphasized in previous literature. The purpose of this study is to examine steering within this example by directing focus towards the relation between the government and private enterprises. A case study is applied on a larger Swedish municipality in which both public agencies, the municipality and private enterprises have participated in policies directed toward enhancing the situation for immigrants. The source material consists primarily of deep interviews conducted during the autumn of 2015, supplemented by written documentation. Findings point to that even if some systems exist for monitoring the tasks undertaken by the introduction guides the private sector themselves describe this as an almost unregulated market. One main reason for this outcome is that internal models among public agencies for reassuring that enterprises acted in an expected way had flaws and were ill coordinated. In conclusion, this is an example of how private features within a reform of this character need to be carefully designed in advance with adequate functions allowing government steering.
