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Government Formation and Extra Parliamentary Influence in Government Formation: Do Presidents Favour Their Parties When They Appoint the Prime Minister?

Constitutions
European Politics
Executives
Government
Parliaments
Political Parties
Cristina Bucur
University College Dublin
José Antonio Cheibub
Texas A&M University
Cristina Bucur
University College Dublin

Abstract

Government formation in parliamentary democracies is supposed to occur within the parliament. Yet, outside actors, such as the head of state, may formally or informally influence which party holds the position of Prime Minister. Based on data for government formation in 21 countries since 1945, we investigate whether presidents in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies wield systematic influence on the PM party choice. We distinguish situations in which government formation is almost pre-determined from those in which power is dispersed among a relatively large number of parties and argue that it is only in the latter situations that we should observe presidential influence. We find that even when power is highly fragmented and presidents are constitutionally empowered to nominate the formateur, the governments that emerge are the same that would have emerged in the absence of a president. That is to say, even under favourable political and institutional conditions, presidents tend to appoint prime ministers from parties other than theirs when these parties are the ones leading a viable coalition. We conclude by arguing that concerns about undue presidential interference in parliamentary democracies are unfounded.