The Third Wave of democracy increased the preponderance of minority presidents who are reliant on multi-party coalitions. This phenomenon known as "coalitional presidentialism" has been studied almost exclusively in Latin America, and mainly with reference to coalitional dynamics at the level of multi-party cabinet coalitions. In this article, we explore the effects of coalitional politics at the level of legislative party voting, and engage with the extant research in two ways. First, we consider whether the way in which cabinet coalitions are formed affects presidential support in a non-Latin American legislature: the Ukrainian Rada. Second, we discuss how floor coalitions in Ukraine differ from cabinet coalitions, and as consequence require presidents to deploy extra-cabinet tools to maintain coalition support. We argue that this distinction between cabinet-level and floor-level coalitions is essential for our understanding of the legislative dynamics of coalitional presidentialism, and we contend that it is likely to travel beyond post-Soviet Ukraine.
