+++ How do political decision-makers deal with the overwhelming challenges posed by severe moments of crisis? Identifying top political leaders as the ones responsible for strategic crisis decision-making and building on insight from cognitive psychology, I argue that individuals cope with the impossible conditions of crisis decision-making by acting intuitively. +++
Moments of crisis have three defining attributes: a sense of fundamental threat, a sense of vast uncertainty and, most importantly, a sense of utmost urgency (Boin et al. 2005: 2-4). Most democratic institutions, e.g. legislatures and ministerial bureaucracies, are ill equipped to deal with these exceptional circumstances. Their routine operating procedures are highly time-consuming and can only be accelerated up to a certain though insufficient pace (Rosa 2010: 71-72). Thus, the key members of the “crisis core executive” (Fleischer/Parrado 2010: 365), such as chancellors, prime ministers or presidents, are left as the sole entities to make strategic decisions in moments of crisis. A phenomenon commonly referred to as the “centralization thesis” (Boin/’t Hart 2003: 547).
In accordance with this assumption, one can infer that crisis decision-making is primarily (but not exclusively) a function of the cognitive decision-making processes of high-level decision-makers. This conclusion, in turn, raises the following question: How do these individuals overcome the obstacles of crisis decision-making? Taking into account that they cannot adhere to “a logic of consequence“ (March 1994: viii), I refer to the latest restatement of the literature on cognitive heuristics (e.g. Kahneman 2012), which embeds the original research on heuristics and biases (e.g. Tversky/Kahneman 1974) into the larger context of “dual-process theories“ (Frankish/Evans 2009: 10). Kahneman distinguishes two cognitive systems, which work in combination with each other when individuals make decisions. The first system (“System 1”) operates effortlessly, proposing intuitive solutions to problems, while the other (“System 2”) monitors these proposals. To fulfil its task of controlling System 1 successfully, System 2 requires cognitive resources such as certain levels of attention and effort. Once these resources are depleted, System 2 can loose its grip on System 1, which, in turn, enables System 1 to take control of the decision-making process (Kahneman 2012: 20-49).
I argue that this mechanism is how political decision-making in moments of crisis can be conceptualized. The impossible conditions of crisis decision-making consume cognitive resources at a rate that constrains System 2, forcing high-level decision-makers to act intuitively. Cases such as George W. Bush’s immediate reaction to the 9/11-attacks illustrate this claim.
References:
Boin/’t Hart 2003: Public Leadership in Times of Crisis
Boin/’t Hart/Stern/Sundelius 2005: The Politics of Crisis Management
Fleischer/Parrado 2010: Power Distribution in Ambiguous Times
Frankish/Evans 2009: The Duality of Mind
Kahneman 2012: Thinking, Fast and Slow
March 1994: A Primer on Decision Making
Rosa 2010: Alienation and Acceleration
Tversky/Kahneman 1974: Judgment under Uncertainty
