Game Change at Advanced Stages of Democratic Consolidation: Hungary as a Blueprint Case?

Why are some post-socialist countries in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), including EU member states, subject to authoritarian ‘backsliding' (Rupnik 2007)? Hungary, once the forerunner of successful transition, presents a striking and plausibly most severe case. Since Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party was elected in 2010, the country has undergone a myriad of institutional change designed for illiberal political ends rather than manipulative political means. The most troubling example is the redrafted constitution that compromises safeguards of liberal constitutionalism and secures state authority with limited oversight. Powerful parties like Fidesz warrant attention because they help shape and lock in a new party structure (Tavits 2013, 1-2). We contend that such parties, with a strategic set of reforms under particular conditions, can also shape and lock in a new hybrid regime structure (Morlino 2013) that is difficult to typify with the existing literature. For instance, a key premise of liberalism is that prerogative is not a problem as long as it is embedded in constitutionalism whereby legitimacy lies in its legality (Neocleous 2008, 35). However, the demarcation between democratic and non-democratic regimes fails to clarify why if policy is codified with a ‘legal rubber stamp’, illiberal practices are acceptable, to what extent, and for how long. For example, the new Hungarian constitution features a number of ‘cardinal laws’ that effectively insulate key redistributive policies and current socio-political governance from any future government action. In response to the outlier development of ongoing democratic erosion in Hungary, we address the following questions: First, how can illiberal action be explained by existing theories and indices that seek to capture structural patterns of variance among governments’ use of rule changing institutional reform? We concur with Herman (2016) who highlights the pivotal role of mainstream parties’ political strategies and commitment to fair competition in allowing for completion of democratic consolidation. We do not fully agree with her suggestion for a culturalist turn as we see actors’ strategic choices rooted in formal and informal institutional settings. Second, what is the precise nature of the illiberal state of democracy in Hungary? Answering this question is a prerequisite to step further: What type of illiberal institutional change impacts on what pillars of quality of democracy? Do certain types and patterns of rule switching reforms embrace a tendency to lock in partly and almost entirely consolidated democracies in a hybrid regime state? Here, we connect the literature on advanced processes of democratic consolidation, international convergence of democratic practice among the subset of third wave democracies in CEE and concepts developed for refined measurement of quality of democracy (e.g. V-DEM, democracy barometer). Finally, might Hungarian experiences serve as a blueprint for government elites in other countries? In fact, there have been first examples of mimicry (Ekiert & Ziblatt 2013 among CEE peers, most notable in Poland. Note: One of the proponents of this paper, David Wineroither, has been involved in the V-DEM project as a country expert.