Rethinking Hierarchy in International Relations: Structural Power, Authority and Legitimacy – the case of the World Bank

Is there authority in international relations? In the context of a “hierarchy turn” unfolding in IR, the concept of authority has recently gained considerable strength from scholars describing the increasing scope and depth of activities by international organizations (Avant et al., 2010; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Bogdandy et al., 2008; Ecker-Erhardt, 2008; Lake, 2010; Zürn, 2015). While these authors point to important empirical developments, I argue that the concept of “authority” is highly misleading, since it confuses authority with other forms of power. In line with Steven Lukes I hold that “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests” (Lukes, 2005) – a definition of power which allows to describe power in direct interactions as well as instances of structural power. The notion of structural power is prominent among Critical Theorists, Post-structuralists and (neo-)Marxists who, despite all their differences, share an understanding about the ways in which social relations are shaped by deep-seated and often invisible background conditions. Drawing on the respective debates in political philosophy, I define authority as “the right to rule” (Raz, 1986). Moreover, I conceive of authority as a specific form of structural power, for it essentially entails an explicit claim to legitimately shape the conditions of social interactions. In contrast to Zürn, Ecker-Erhardt and Bogdandy et al. whose conceptions of authority rely on the “voluntary deference of judgement”, I argue that authority inherently involves two claims: (a) that the institution has the right to rule, and (b) that those subject to the institution have a corresponding duty to obey. By carving out this normative content, Zürn et al. confuse authority for what in effect is the illegitimate exercise of structural power. On the other hand and in contrast to scholars who abandon the authority concept all together (e.g. Daase & Deitelhoff, 2015), I argue that we need to keep it as an evaluative standard for global governance constellations. In order to illustrate how this conceptual clarification has significant normative and practical implications, I will analyze World Bank activities. The World Bank not only commands economic power in direct interactions, it also has structural power shaping the development discourse like no other IO. In its projects, the World Bank reproduces certain norms, but at times also allows for community-driven development and a minimum of accountability where the state fails to do so. But does it ever exercise authority? Instead of evaluating the World Bank as a whole, I propose a fine-grained analysis of different types of World Bank engagement by drawing on interviews (conducted in Washington D.C., Haiti, Colombia and Niger) and secondary material. In sum, a detailed case study of World Bank activities against the background of my conceptual differentiation between authority and other forms of structural power allows a better evaluation of the hierarchy we observe with regard to international organizations. Ultimately, this may guide reform proposals, reasons for protest or even resistance.