Constraining the Choice of Presidential Re-Election Rules through Intraparty Competition in Latin America

Increasingly, Latin American presidents have become to be viewed as predominant political actors who are unaccountable to neither voters nor their own (presidentialized) parties which are usually seen as too feeble to be able to constrain their own presidents. Conversely, this paper suggests that presidential parties under certain circumstances may act as principals reining in their presidential agents. This paper analyzes the determinants of the adoption of one the most controversial electoral rules in Latin America: the possibility of immediate presidential reelection. An explanation of the recent wave of constitutional changes in favor of more permissive reelection rules in Latin America is presented based on a principal-agent model of intraparty relations within the presidential party. The theoretical model suggests causal mechanisms through which institutionalized presidential parties constrain the decision to scrap term limits. The theoretical implications are tested using both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Results from logistic regression suggest that the likelihood of removing term limits in Latin American countries (1990-2013) significantly declines with the level of presidential party institutionalization. Case study evidence illustrates the operation of the theoretically-derived causal mechanisms. Process tracing techniques are used to assess the evidence in cases of both successful term limit evasion (such as the mandates of Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales) and cases were such constitutional changes were attempted but failed (Tabaré Vázquez, Manuel Zelaya or the second term of Carlos Menem). The findings have novel implication both for the literature that analyzes the relationship between the presidents and their parties in presidential regimes as well as for the normative debates regarding the desirability of instituting presidential term limits.