The incoherence of essentially contested concepts

Do the requirements for concepts to be regarded as essentially contested empty the category so defined? This essay will demonstrate that the idea of an essentially contested concept is incoherent because the necessary requirements to reach this diagnosis are paradoxical; they reveal a lack of persistent disagreement, sufficient common ground to decontest the concept or require that mutually contradictory positions be held by each inquirer relative to the debate. W. B. Gallie argues a “fairly rigid schematisation” can enlighten discussions of highly complex concepts, where essentially contested concepts “inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper use.” Here, I focus on two criteria offered by Gallie, which I take as essential for establishing a concept as being essentially contested, reciprocal recognition and an exemplar. Reciprocal recognition, along with acknowledgement of the authority of an original exemplar as the necessary evidential standard (the 6th criteria), delineates essentially contested concepts from other confused and contested concepts. I start by examining reciprocal recognition from the perspective of agents involved in the argument and those analysing it objectively, concluding that incoherence at every step precludes establishing a concept as essentially contested. I will explore the weaknesses of the different types of evidential standard. I also refer to Dworkin’s idea of interpretive concepts as those which people share on the basis their “correct application is fixed by the best interpretation of the practices in which they figure.” Finally I discuss the risk of relativism and conclude the idea of an essentially contested concept is thoroughly incoherent.