Religious symbols in public functions: do they really endanger or disturb state neutrality?

Can/should it be allowed for public servants to wear religious symbols such as headscarves, visible crucifixes, kippahs or turbans? This question resulted in many Western countries in an intensive and often polarized public and political debates. An analysis of these debates shows that many different arguments has been used to defend a ban on religious symbols for officials: a) religion is a private matter and religious symbols are against the separation of state and church, b) headscarves and (other religious symbols) are linked with problematic beliefs and attitudes about women, homosexuality, freedom and equality, c) wearing religious symbols and clothing is not a religious duty (e.g. the argument that the headscarf is not mentioned in the Koran), d) some citizens may be offended by (certain) religious symbols, e) a ban is necessary in order to ensure a general confidence in the state, f) if we allow religious symbols the next step will be to accept sharia law, g) allowing religious symbols is against the idea of integration, etc. After a critical evaluation of these arguments, I will argue that from a liberal political philosophical perspective state neutrality is the strongest one: ‘workers in the public service must be impartial and neutral, and so cannot show their religious beliefs with an outward symbol’. This argument is fair in terms of freedom and equality because it does not aim to (dis)advance one particular religion or worldview. It is in fact a political (neutral) argument and as such not in contradiction with the liberal (Rawlsian) idea of public reason. Finally, this paper will critically question whether state neutrality can indeed necessitate limitations on the freedom of public officials to display religious symbols. According to the defenders of a ban, the tension between the positive freedom of religion and the negative freedom should be solved in favour of the latter: citizens have the right to be by served by visible neutral state officials. I will argue that this is not necessarily the case. State neutrality and impartiality can also be guaranteed by state officials through their attitudes and actions, citizens can be asked to be tolerant for religious symbols and apart from the rights-discourse, the ban can also have an unnecessary negative symbolic effect for immigrants and minorities. In some circumstances it can be wise as a society to accept visible diversity. The allowance of religious symbols can help religious citizens/minorities to perceive society also as their society. In conclusion: liberalism and public reason are inconclusive about the ban on religious symbols for public servants. There is a valid argument to argue against religious symbols in public functions, but the argument is not a sufficient argument and there are other liberal arguments to question such a ban. Therefore on this particular issue it can be wise to accept a context-sensitive approach and to be skeptical toward all kind of a top-down and one-size-fits-all approaches.