Disentangling National and International Party Politics

Political parties play an essential role in articulating and structuring political choice in democratic societies. However, the internationalisation of politics has put this function under the pressure. Especially when it comes to international issues, mainstream parties tend to adopt rather similar positions, to be challenged only by anti-establishment (and often anti-pluralistic) parties. As a consequence, alternative lines of action – and indeed of democratic choice – fail to be systematically developed in international politics. This paper posits that the main reason why this is the case is that most international political actors remain anchored in national parties and, as these parties have historically been primarily identified in socio-economic terms, they are ill equipped to address the key division lines in the international domain. Notably, many mainstream parties have an interest to suppress international (and European) concerns because their constituency is deeply divided on it (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004). At the same time, where national parties collaborate with colleagues in other countries who putatively share the same ideology, actual differences in character and interests generally prevent distinctive or original position-taking. Against this background, developments that would allow for the disentanglement of a supranational political sphere from national political parties and their strategic interests become of particular interest. For sure, national political parties have a continuing interest to retain a close grip on international politics, but there are also clear signs of steady rifts between international politicians and national political parties. This paper examines this tension and its dynamics on the basis of few illustrative case studies. First, I look at instances in which the voting behaviour of members of the European Parliament deviates from the preferences of their national factions with a particular focus on the EU Services directive. Second, I consider the prospect of proposals to introduce a second vote for the European Parliament that would allow part of its seats to be elected on the basis of transnational lists (besides the present national lists). Turning to executive positions, I examine the increase of such positions (from the European Commission to the High Representative, the Eurogroup Chair, the European Council President etc.) over time, and the incremental way these positions tend to become subject to supranational accountability. With particular reference to the recent Spitzenkandidaten-process by which the outcome of the 2014 EP elections determined the election of the Commission President, this raises the question whether these developments can issue in a democratically elected European government with its corresponding, own supranational party dynamics.