We are now in the antechamber of a new global bipolarity. During the Cold War, the bipolar order was an expression of the confrontation between the two non-European superpowers. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the unipolar moment of the US domination brought stability to the world. With the crisis came the understanding that unipolarity had reached its limits. The crisis marked the transfer of power from the developed to the emerging world. The world is currently experiencing a short stage of uni-multipolarity, characterised by high instability, which is generated by the rise of new regional hegemons, the changes at the top of power hierarchies, the diminishing gap between the US (as the only superpower of the moment) and the rising powers. The conflict between global order and regional order is, implicitly, a conflict between Western and emerging countries development models. An analysis of the current stage of international relations reveals that we are now witnessing double bipolarity: an American-Chinese economic bipolarity and an American-Russian military bipolarity.
In this context, it is relevant to discuss Europe’s position. The core-periphery relationship, the Euro crisis, the increasing gaps between economies within the Union and at its top are various layers in a structural crisis pervading Europe. With the shift of US foreign policy interests towards the Pacific and the spectacular rise of China, what is Europe’s say in global politics? More significantly, can it propose a coherent development model to rising powers? One of the power shifts encouraged by the crisis was from Bruxelles to Berlin. Germany is one of the obvious winners of the crisis, with its choice of manufacturing and institutional reform. Germany’s recent options in economic alliances have made the US fear the union of German capital and technology with Russian resources and capacities.
On the other hand, a by-product of the crisis, Euroscepticism, is ravaging Europe. This complex phenomenon amasses not just the excess and mistakes in the financial and banking system, but also the results of economic trends (such as delocalization or excessive interest in services over manufacturing) and costly delays in the Union’s construction.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate these new shifts in the international balance of power from the privileged position of analysts writing from the periphery of Europe.
