The paper examines the development of new norms in the field of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by focusing on the processes that led to the adoption of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty in the face of opposition by major military powers, such as the US, Russia, and China. Such non-hegemonic norm development is usually attributed to the persuasive power of weaker actors, such as NGOs, to change the discursive landscape and win the support of middle powers such as Canada, Western European, and Scandinavian countries, usually seen as “good international citizens.” In addition, I argue that the inclusion of developing countries has been crucial for the ultimate success of normative initiatives. And developing countries, especially from Africa and Latin America, have been drawn to norm development by their aspiration to independence and status enhancement. The retrograde position of superpowers, and the US in particular, have served as foil to distinguish the leadership and humanitarian credentials of developing states and NGOs have actively sought to engender a dynamic of leadership competition by highlighting the obstructionist role of the US. In contrast to conventional accounts according to which international norms emerge either because of great power backing or despite great power opposition, I argue that new norms can also take off because of great power opposition and the ways in which NGOs frame the roles states could play in the process. Rather than norm laggards, as developing states from Africa and Latin America are usually portrayed, in the cases examined here they are norm champions on whose support norm development depends. In-depth examination of the cluster munition and landmine processes and the role of African states in them illustrates the above argument. Its validity is further probed by paired comparisons of the ratification dynamics of the examined treaties with other international humanitarian law and human rights treaties, including the ICC statute and the Arms Trade Treaty. Thus, the paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of status ranking, highlighting its ideational and relational components. It also shows the importance of status considerations for norm development even in an area where material security interests are assumed to be of singular importance.
