Most hegemonic-stability and power-transition theorists pay surprising little attention to the power politics of international order itself. They might treat international order as a dependent variable—as in studies of whether, and under what conditions, hegemons facilitated free-trade regimes or suppressed interstate conflict. Both theories, of course, view the ability of an hegemonic order to accommodate rising powers as crucial to its stability. The character of that order—and how it aligns with interests and ideologies of rising powers—determines the level of conflict associated with power transitions. But of these perspectives fail to capture the myriad ways in which power-political activities maintain, undermine, or transform hegemonic orders. As Barma et al. (2009: 528) write, mainstream “international relations scholarship surmises that rising powers are presented with a binary choice: assimilate to the existing order, or challenge it.” Goods substitution, we contend, constitutes one of the major threats to contemporary international order. Although states may not always intend to “hollow out” liberal order, asset substitution often undermines its rules and norms. It does so with or without directly challenging the power-position of the hegemon.
