Somaliland has frequently been portrayed as an African ‘success story’, which is generally traced to the benevolent role of traditional authorities, processes of bottom-up governance and grassroots democracy, a political culture of peace, and a vivid structure of hybrid political orders. While these factors have, undoubtedly, constituted part of the story, Somaliland’s state-making trajectory was importantly shaped by experiences of war and political violence. Investigating the explanatory power of the Tillyan ‘war makes states’ dictum, this article explores the role of large-scale violent conflict for the emergence and development of Somaliland. I argue that the polity’s state-making project was at least as much shaped by war, than by peace, both prior and subsequent to the declaration of independence in 1991. The article shows both how the bellicose structures of governance that emerged during the liberation struggle laid the foundations for the self-declared state, and how Somaliland’s political elite willingly opted for civil war that ultimately advanced its state-making endeavour. It is concluded that, while collective political violence is neither an angel of order nor a daemon of decay, war can, under certain conditions, still be constitutive of state formation.
