The lobbyists in the EU policy-making: are the 'experts' more powerful and why?

This paper deals with the contributions of the EU-lobbyists in the policy-making and explains the role played by their expertise in their power. Since the participative turn in the 2000's, the stakeholders have taken part in different stages of the EU policy-making process (consultations, impact assessment, reports...). Their participation is often justified by the expertise they can provide. But all lobbyists can’t provide expertise, and the expertise they provide is not always considered as «good» and «useful». According to the EU administration, there are «good lobbyists» who understand the need of the administration, and «too political lobbyists» who fail to provide «objective arguments». The objective of this paper is to take into account the differences of the lobbyists regarding this capacity of providing «good» expertise and to understand what is at stake in the relationship between lobbyists and EU-administration. In a sociological perspective, the paper will examine how «expertise» has become a required capital within the EU field of eurocracy. It will also point out how the expertise will shape both the relationship between actors within the field and the actors that want to intervene within the EU field.