The effects of party change on federal dynamics: the German case

The German pattern of federal democracy has been described as a system of tight coupling of parliamentary democracy and cooperative federalism (Benz/Sonnicksen 2016). This has to do with the distribution of legislative and administrative competences which facilitated strong structures of joint decision-making in the production of public policies. But tight coupling has also been the effect of the strong role of political parties in federal negotiations, particularly via the Bundesrat. As the seminal study of Lehmbruch (1976, 2000) argued, this system may lead to the clash of the territorial and the partisan principle of representation, producing either federal deadlock or the hollowing out of party competition. It is interesting to note, however, that Lehmbruch based his argument on the evolution of the German party competition since the 1970s, with a strong dualism between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in a highly concentrated party system. He even discussed, in the later editions of his book, party system fragmentation as a possible solution to what he described as the incompatibility between parliamentary democracy and federalism. Following on from there, the paper discusses the effects of party change on federal dynamics in the German case. These changes are twofold. On the one hand, asymmetries in party competition between levels and between the regions have made the processes of government formation in the Länder more incongruent. There now is a patchwork of coalitions with parties having different partners in different places. As a result, the dualistic pattern of party competition has been eroded. On the other hand, vertical party integration has become weaker. The Land parties have started to go their own ways by making more extensive use of their formal powers of autonomy. As a result, establishing clear party lines in federal negotiations and closing the ranks behind a federal party strategy has become more difficult. The paper argues that there now is less partisan confrontation in federal bargaining but also less partisan accommodation of conflicting interests. The federal government is confronted with unclear Bundesrat majorities which is even true for the current grand coalition. The Länder have become more likely to represent particular regional interests or to strike alliances irrespective of partisan considerations. More generally speaking, there now is less party democracy in German federalism than in Lehmbruchian times.