The governance structure of the African Peer Review Mechanism: the consequences of a division of labour

Modern interactions among states are characterized by a pervasive presence of international institutions. They are found in almost every area of interest to states. The prominence of international institutions has given rise to their study with an early focus on whether international institutions really matter. This paper focuses on the governance and operation of one such institution, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It engages modern institutional theory to explain the emergence of a governance system in the African Peer Review process. The paper observes that the governance structure of the APRM is characterized by a division of labour between the Forum (Head of states of participating countries) and the APR Panel (the body responsible for overseeing the operation of the mechanism). It argues that a division of labour between the sub-bodies in the APRM process may enhance the quality of decisions that are made. As a result there is a demand on the various organs to be accountable for the decisions they make and this could push rational actors to resort to general guidelines as a point of reference in resolving stalemates in the decision process. The paper specifically investigates the role of delegation to sub-bodies within the institutional design of the APRM. Why do member states delegate decision making authority to sub-bodies in the APRM and under which conditions will agents make decisions that are in the interest of member states? Methodologically, the paper utilizes process-tracing and expert interviews to establish the mechanisms that are at play in producing the final recommendations that are contained in the Country Review Reports that are produced at the end of a country review process.