Post-conflict states are among the most corrupt in the world. But does international statebuilding alleviate or exacerbate the problem? The peacekeeping literature has pointed to the inherent corruption risks in international peace and statebuilding missions as well as their unintended consequences. In the same vein, corruption scholars increasingly question whether external interventions have any discernible impact on corruption. I argue that these assessments routinely rely on a few non-representative cases. Taking into account the entire sample of states with exposure to international peace missions, the paper presents empirical evidence that – on average – states with exposure to international peace missions are no more and no less corrupt than other states when controlling for development. I propose a theoretical framework that conceptualizes mission intrusiveness as key independent variable to explain the level of corruption in the target states of peace missions and argue that missions under robust, but limited peacekeeping mandates are more likely to facilitate a domestic political process leading to better governance, whereas integrated and highly intrusive missions with complex or executive mandates tend to lock-in domestic power relations including government favoritism. Presenting quantitative evidence from the sample of peace-mission states as well as a qualitative analysis from a case study on Kosovo, the paper challenges the critical assessment of peace missions that is prevailing in the literature. I conclude with a discussion of the conditions and mechanisms that enable or restrain corruption in statebuilding environments.
