Parliamentary and Executive Routes to Shared Rule: a comparative analysis

Federalism provides institutional mechanisms for balancing self-rule and shared rule. Whereas self-rule refers to the level of decision-making autonomy that sub-state governments and parliaments can exercise, shared rule concerns the input and influence of those constituent units in decision making at the centre, especially in policy matters that directly or indirectly affect regional competences. Shared rule can be exercised in a variety of ways and through a variety of institutions, including a second chamber of the federal legislature providing for the representation of territorial interests, regional veto powers in concurrent policy spheres, or cooperation and co-decision within the intergovernmental arena. Our paper contrasts parliamentary and executive routes to exercising shared rule, exploring why, when, and under what conditions regional institutions exercise more or less authority within the territorial second chambers or the intergovernmental arena, and we identify the political, constitutional and institutional factors which contribute to variations in the degree of shared rule.