CSDP Missions in highly politicized peace processes: Lessons from EULEX Kosovo to Ukraine and beyond

EULEX Kosovo has been the flagship of the EU civilian crisis management. It has been the biggest and the most expensive operation ever conducted under the CSDP. Recently Kosovo’s political scene has been characterized by the EU facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Some of the agreements reached have been violently denounced by opposition forces. The EU rule of law mission is caught between two fires – on one hand it is supporting to implement some of the dialogue agreements, and on the other hand, at the same time, it serves as a technical advisor monitoring and mentoring Kosovo’s rule of law institutions. In Kosovo, the dialogue process is firmly in the hands of the EU High Representative. The comprehensive approach, nevertheless, highlights the importance of using EU tools coherently for the same goal. Even though the External Action Service and the European Commission are attempting to work more coherently in post-conflict areas, it is important to remember that European Union Common Defence and Security Policy is very much in the hands of the 28 member states. The decisions, such as those related to the objectives of crisis management missions, are made in unanimity among the member states — and thus often require compromises among differing interests. It has been very clear that the more representatives the international community has in Kosovo, the less authority and influence it wields on local politics and reforms. EU member states are not united in their stance towards Kosovo. The EU actors on the field, such as the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo as well as the EU Office, need to be status neutral in their activities and discourse, but at the same time must be able to work coherently in the reality of Kosovo, where independent institutions make decisions as in any sovereign country. A number of lessons should be drawn from the experiences of the EULEX Mission: Firstly, these lessons relate to EU’s internal matters, to the coordination of EU actors in the field and the goal-setting of actors such as a CSDP Mission. Secondly, these lessons relate to the EU interaction with local actors and the questions of local ownership. Thirdly, a number of lessons are linked with current academic debates on peacebuilding and on the role of the third party. Very little theorization exist of dialogue processes. In general, the current criticism focuses on the open ended peace building missions. “Peace-building practices keep society in a permanent state of emergency as the prevailing policy is about constantly ‘rescuing’ the society. Therefore, peace-building ultimately constructs an unending process.” (Audra Mitchell) “Far from generating peace, various peace-building interventions end up maintaining, at best, conflicts-in resolution, and, at worst, unstable conflicts.” (Bahar Rumelili) This paper suggests an overview of EULEX experiences in light of the current critique of liberal peace drawing attention to a number of lessons that should be taken into account in Ukraine and beyond.