Governance by non-state actors has received increased attention. However, it is still controversial to what extent private governance regimes operate in an effective ‘shadow of hierarchy’. While it is often suggested that private governance is a recent phenomenon, we focus on international football where a private governance regime actively claiming autonomy from public authorities has been established in 1904. We provide comparative case study evidence that FIFA as football’s global regulator has been able to force national governments and regulators to abandon interference in football’s matters even in case of blatant failures of private governance. Thus, governance of international football support the claim that private regimes providing unique governance contributions represents an institutional equilibrium able to resist challenges. Moreover, private governance arrangements that generate positive feedbacks for political stakeholders can accumulate such power resources that they can shape their political environment. However, the outcomes of FIFA’s political victories are highly problematic since the governmental interventions were intended to mitigate serious failures in sectoral governance. Thus, while FIFA’s interventions have the effect to discourage national governments to fight misconduct in sport, it can be questioned whether private governance can deal with the regulatoryproblems at stake.
