Public reason (PR) requires that public decisions be justified to all qualified parties in a social condition of permanent pluralism. PR is a procedure of conflict containment. It is not a procedure of conflict management (people engaged in public reason are united by civic friendship and cooperate, although divided by worldviews), nor a procedure of conflict resolution (people will always be divided by worldviews).
Rival strategies of guidelines of PR include the consensus view (public decisions must be justified to each and all, on the base of a shared set of reasons) and the convergence view (public decisions must be justified to each and all citizens, but the justifications may be based on different justificatory standards).
Quong defends the consensus view against Gaus’s convergence view, because – he says – a person (Alf) cannot sincerely think that another person (Betty) is justified, if he thinks that her reason(s) is (are) wrong. Alternatively, in such a situation Alf can think that Betty is justified, but he must endorse a controversial epistemology which, as such, contravenes the guidelines of PR. Respecting the sincerity requirement is of primary importance for PR as a strategy of conflict containment, because this is one of the grounds of civic friendship and trust that permits stable cooperation in a society divided by worldviews.
Quong’s version of the sincerity objection is wrong. Alf can think that Betty is justified according to her internal standards, even if he doesn’t share these standards, and, so, sincerely think that she is justified. Alf need not to be committed by this to a controversial philosophical epistemology. He may endorse what is only a proper concept of justification in the political domain, where people are taken as free and equal in conditions of burdens of judgment and reasonable pluralism.
