Corruption is a serious obstacle to economic and social development, respect of human rights and minor group interests. In the absence of control, corruption can seriously damage institutional system, which will lead to its dysfunction or to drastic changes in its content. In the case of political corruption occurrence these institutional changes will lead to direct or indirect profit gaining for certain actors. Successful profit gaining should comply with two conditions: profit gaining should be maximally secured and the process should be almost similar to official procedure. As usually supposed by part of academic? society, corruption occurrences are a set of single informal occasions. The reason of this understanding is taking into consideration the risk for corrupted actor of being fined or sanctioned. Every change of “game rules” has long term effects, which lasts after the profit was gained. Implementation of traditional instruments of institutional analysis will help to reveal corrupted norms, rules, make a snapshot of the new situation, but it will fail to explain why corruption has changed formal rules and what effect will follow after this change? The presented study finds out how corruption can change formal institutions, even federal legislation, making the abuse of power to be a non-deviant action. It shows how the mechanism of corruption component integration works and where blindspots are located. The use of evolutionary institutional approach gave a possibility to elaborate instruments for tracking institutional changes, caused by corruption and reveal a “corruption multiplier”: effect leading to uncontrolled corruption growth. These changes lead to a process of institutional devolution: rules become instruments for profit gaining for certain group of people. The empirical part of study is focused on the Russian anticorruption reform case, proving that it was distorted by a corruption, and the secure path for power abuses were created.
