When Regions: Decide Subnational Influence at National Level in Switzerland, Germany, Canada and the US

Federal states stand out for their balance between self-rule and shared rule: regional autonomy in some policy areas is mirrored by nation-wide co-decision powers in others. This paper looks at cross-sectional and cross-regional differences in the latter dimension. Why, how and when do regions try to influence national decisions? Adopting a rational choice framework that regards politicians as striving for maximum decisional discretion while incurring minimum costs, I expect all regional executives to try and shift burdens either upwards, to the national level; sideways, onto other regions; or downwards, onto local governments. The nature of the federal (dual vs. administrative) and governmental system (parliamentary vs. presidential) is an important explanatory factor for which strategy dominates. At the same time, variation in the goals and instruments of shared rule across regions is based on partisanship, political culture, size and/or economic wellbeing. After developing the first theoretical framework on the actual use of shared rule, this paper studies two policy areas, primary education and fiscal equalisation, in greater depth. The four federations compared are Switzerland (quasi-presidential/executive federalism), Germany (parliamentary/executive), Canada (parliamentary/dual) and the US (presidential/dual).