When distributing offices, the number of available positions is crucial for electoral candidacies (see Alozie and Manganaro 1993). In this regard, the likelihood of appointing more or less women is related to the number of cabinet seats (ministries). Group diversity is likely to be undermined in small cabinets; that is, individuals from groups that have traditionally been excluded, such as women, have fewer chances of getting appointed. Seemingly, coalitions follow the same logic: when the senior party trades cabinet seats to other partners for government stability, intra-party competition for the available posts sharpens (Ceron 2012, Flescher and Seyfied 2013), thereby increasing the likelihood of men being appointed. Under single-party governments, in contrast, the party can fill all cabinet posts, potentially increasing the diversification of profiles of those appointed. Departing from this literature, the aim of this study is to analyse coalition governments on the composition of the executive, on both the percentage of women ministers selected to government, as well as on the allocation on the different portfolios. Previous studies show mixed results because they compare different systems of government (parliamentary and presidential systems) (Claveria 2014). By focusing on the regional level, I have the opportunity to examine the effect of coalition governments while keeping the social and institutional environment constant. This will be done longitudinally examining an original dataset with information on the composition of all Spanish regional governments from 1980 to 2015.
