In developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the problem of setting-agenda depends most of the time on international donors interventions. This explains why developing countries' public policies are tied to donor preferences. To explore the impact of donor action on the agenda-setting in developing countries, this Paper will focus on role played by the World Bank in promoting an integrated coastal zone management project in Senegal.
At frist, by adopting a socio-historical approach sensitive to the practices of individuals, this communication sheds the light on the institutional strength of the World Bank in that setting-agenda processs. It shows the actors who within the World Bank have encouraged for nearly a decade the promotion of such a policy and above all the reasons that motivated the agents of the World Bank to establish cooperation between the local Fisheries and the Conservation Departments. It shows the promotion of such collaboration is not so much based on the local ecosystem dynamics of the coastal biodiversity or in connection with the approaches of the civil society, but on much more linked to the internal institutional logics of the World Bank (the logic of the World Bank's implementation of the Senegalese environment policy, fisheries management in Washington, logistics of disbursement, etc.).
In a second time, this Paper will focus on the effects of this imposed policy and shows how the reception of such a project was carried out by the Senegalese state actors in charge of it, in particular the members of the government. This point highlights the governmental resistance to that project and helps us to understand the failure of the public policy instruments that were envisaged to implement this integrated coastal management project (an interministerial co-management tool, a tool for collaboration between technical services).
