This Paper relies on the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework to appraise regulators’ incentives to form peer networks. I analyse the case of networks involving European regulators in infrastructure sectors (energy, telecom, water, railway). The analysis shows that regulators from mixed market coordination regimes are systematic network initiators. At establishment (or as they acquire new tasks) they, more than regulators from other types of economies, need to bolster their domestically contested legitimacy. They thus resort to networking with their counterparts in other countries and supranational institutions. Over time, as they become embedded in the market configuration of the country, they come to use networks to achieve the mediation role that the literature recognized to the state in hybrid economies, helping industry to face transnational challenges. Overall, regulators from different countries seek to shape the network agenda according to the market coordination mode they are familiar with. This may hamper or impede regulatory coordination when policy issues have different consequences for market actors from different types of economies.
