Transnational Collective Bargaining for Joint Liability in Global Garment Production: Comparing the Experiences of Lead Firms across Different Varieties of Capitalism

GPN scholars (e.g. Anner et al. 2013) increasingly promote transnational collective bargaining arrangements as a solution to ongoing collective action problems in the governance of GPNs. Others propose consumption approaches due to the weakness of unions in some countries and argue that production-based and consumption-based power is complementary in GPN governance (Donaughy & Reinecke 2015, etc.). Global unions in particular have become more active and legitimized actors in GPN governance solutions, particularly through the spread of global framework agreements (GFAs). Unlike in traditional collective bargaining, which is nationally based, transnational collective bargaining arrangements involve firms and unions from different institutional backgrounds and with different norms and practices related to unionization and collective bargaining. Such institutional differences have already challenged the implementation of GFAs across national borders (cf. Helfen et al. 2016). Lead firms are developing new roles in relation to transnational collective bargaining. This paper explores the experiences of major garment firms with such arrangements. Our aim is to dig deeper into the changing relationship between firms and (global) unions in this emerging field of “transnational industrial relations”. Our analysis is focused on three two arrangements which have involved lead garment firms interacting with global unions, namely the Play Fair Freedom of Association Protocol, the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety and ACT (Action, Collaboration, Transformation). Data considered is mainly based on interviews with representatives of lead firms and global unions. Two main questions are considered. First, we explore the dynamics involved in collaboration between firms and (global) unions. Second, we compare the experiences of lead firms based in coordinated and liberal market economies. This builds on research by Lane and Probert (2009), which considers how lead firms based within different national capitalisms can have different strategies which shape their relationships across GPNs.