The Interplay between Institutional Dynamics and Public Preferences in Matters of Religion: Marriage Regulation in Israel and Turkey

The Historical-Institutionalism strand of literature suggests that Legal-institutional arrangements are shaped, to a large extent, in the critical juncture of state building, while gaining their legitimacy in the establishment of the new born state. When fixated, these institutions acquire a self-sustaining mechanism, which maintains itself in a form of a 'lock-in' (Mahoney, 2000). It is commonly argued that legal-institutional arrangements are bound to change when losing their legitimacy. Loss of legitimacy is expected when political institutions are not responsive to public preferences. According to Dahl (1971), a situation in which state institutions remain unresponsive to citizen preferences embodies a democratic deficit, as in such instances one would expect mounting challenges to modify them. Nevertheless, there are political situations in which such arrangements sustain and enjoy significant level of legitimacy. The ongoing existence of such situations is the puzzle that this study wishes to explain. Specifically, the current study reveals the institutional tactics that facilitate the continuity of unresponsive legal-institutional arrangements in contemporary democratic states. The main purpose of this study is to propose a theoretical micro-level institutional explanation for why various manifestations of public preferences are not echoed in the state's legal-institutional arrangements. It addresses the question of; "Why legal-institutional arrangements which are not responsive to public preferences endure?" I investigate this question in the realm of "marriage policy" in Israel and Turkey. This comparison is interesting since the official policy on marriage in both countries is far from reflecting public preferences and de facto civil behavior; In Israel, large segments of the population prefer an option of civil marriage (70% in 2014), but only religious marriage is statutory recognized. In Turkey, the opposite trend takes place; the state recognizes only civil marriage whereas an overwhelming majority of Turkish citizens (94% in 2013) prefer marrying in a religious ceremony. Using a comparative method, this study offers and tests a novel institutional explanation to this inquiry. It demonstrates the capacity of state institutions to contain societal pressures to modify. It argues that legal-institutional arrangements which are not responsive to public preferences avoid being challenged by the public, by employing a combination of three institutional tactics; 1) Sustaining political legitimacy; 2) imposing coercion; 3) maintaining pressure relief valves The main contribution of this study lays in focusing on the active measures taken by institutions to preserve their design despite changing public attitudes towards them along time. This constitutes a contribution to knowledge because it emphasizes a relatively understudied aspect of institutional continuity; Top-down Historical Institutionalism approaches deal mainly with the theoretical premise of institutional sustainability, but rarely offer specific traceable tactics at the micro level. Likewise, Bottom-up approaches deal mainly with civil society and public challenges to legal-institutional arrangement from below, and treat institutions as reactive actors. Policy wise, this study enhances knowledge of Israel and Turkey in a critical time of public dispute over state-religion relations; it offers an overall examination of their institutional design, while providing tools to comprehend the historical dynamics which brought about current arrangements.