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Turning a Blind Eye: The US and the Israeli Nuclear Program

Foreign Policy
International Relations
UN
Decision Making
Arie Leo Geronik
Open University of Israel
Arie Leo Geronik
Open University of Israel

Abstract

The aim of this Paper is to examine the reasoning behind the US turning a blind eye toward Israel's nuclear capability. By law, the administration is obligated to impose sanctions on every country that joins the "Nuclear Club" in addition to the five declared nuclear states. This is why the US imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan in May 1998. Despite this, and in spite of the American perception of the Non Profileration Treaty (NPT), not only has the US not imposed sanctions on Israel,but the latter enjoys the lion's share of US foreign aid. This Paper tries to follow the logic of this policy, which has been consistent since the Nixon administration, and appears to be a paradox. My hypothesis is that by ignoring Israel's nuclear policy of ambiguity, the US can continue to declare her ongoing commitment to the security of Israel, while not having to anchor it in a formal pact, which might jeopardize US interests in the Arab world. By adopting such a policy, both the US and Israel can "have their cake and eat it too". Of all aspects of Israel's national security policy, no one have a massive public support as does the policy regarding the nuclear issue, known as "nuclear ambiguity". According to this policy, Israel officially makes no comment regarding its nuclear status, activities or capabilities. It neither confirms nor denies anything. Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity relies on an unwritten understanding between Prime Minister Golda Meair and President Richard Nixon in 1969, by which Israel would maintain a certain vagueness regarding the nuclear issue and would not conduct nuclear tests. In return, the US would avoid pressuring Israel into joining the NPT. Following their meeting, the two leaders documented what was said. However, the original documentation of the conversation exists in neither the American nor the Israeli National Archives. The surprising absence of documentation indicates the high sensitivity of the issue; it seems that as a result, researchers' access to the past is limited and we are doomed to ambiguity, both concerning the content of the conversation and the motives for the understandings reached. In Israels folklore, the Nixon - Meir Understandings are considered an unparalleled success story. They have always been inerpreted as an American commitment to shield Israel's nuclear program, while it remains commited to restrain and opacity. These understandings indeed shielded Israel but put it in the position of a 'nuclear mistress', the kind you cannot be seen with in public. Should this policy continue in the face of another Middle Eastern actor becoming nuclear, is another question this paper will try to answer.