Selective Uniform and Global Inclusions in the Laws of Economic Citizenship

This Paper discusses the phenomenon of direct sale- and acquisition of citizenship “by investment”, referring to the naturalization of individuals without any- or only negligible residency periods (‘economic citizenship’). Economic citizenship is conceptualized as a tool of in- and exclusion. Its very existence points toward a new concept of citizenship marked by global mobility and general flexibility. The paper firstly identifies an exclusive approach to economic citizenship, admitting select individuals as Olympians or as wealthy investors based on large ‘donations’ or the ‘service to a nation’ and at times, the ‘service to humanity’. Another, more uniform approach refers to a set fee for citizenship, applicable to all migrants. Both approaches seem to allow for sovereign nations to put price-tags on citizenship and to perpetuate sovereign power of in- and exclusion over citizenship. However, they also seem to invite a post-national mercantile perspective, with individual- as well as global-market bargaining powers entering citizenship as the ‘last bastion’ of the sovereign state. The paper here points at the ‘gatekeepers’ paradox’ - referring to the self-erosion of sovereignty and control by the selling state, evident in selling-nations having seen the urge to further minimize (or completely waive) residency periods in a bid to increase their competitiveness. Conversely, states may become dominant players on the global market for citizenship, re-shaping standards that include its legal frameworks and its price. Are states now transforming from ‘gatekeepers’ to ‘shopkeepers,’ eventually losing control over ‘thin,’ flag-of-convenience citizenship, or in fact re-create citizenship within an individual- global paradigm?