Federalism is a system, which is characterized by complex interrelations between several actors. As a result, the federal system is highly competitive, polycentric and unpredictable when dealing with the results of political bargaining. At the same time, authoritarianism can be defined as a system that tends to a monocentric regime of policy making. An authoritarian ruler prevents the appearance of other significant actors, who would be outside his control. Therefore we can conclude that real federation contradicts a ruler’s political interests and he will reduce or even eliminate political decentralization in his state.
But we know that federalism is not always a free option for institutional makers. Federalism is often created as a response to challenges concerning complex ethnic or religious composition, large territory and economic disparities between regions. Hence, a dictator sometimes needs to decentralize his state, but at the same time, keep a monocentric political regime.
How does he do it? Can a dictator keep a balance between economic needs and political interests? Contemporary Russia is an example of how one authoritarian regime attempts to solve this inherent problem.
The report is devoted to analysis of the Russian regional policy that was implemented in 2000s. Because of its political preferences, over the last ten years the Center has eliminated basic federal institutions in Russia. But despite forming a de-facto unitary state, Russia remains administratively decentralized state. The main problem of such a system is connected with the agency dilemma (McCubins, Schwartz, 1984) – the Center can hardly control current activities of the regional governments and the effectiveness of their governing. Rejected federalism, the Center tries to provide effective development using “police patrol” model that helps to provide political control but leads to strengthening economic and social problems.
