On the Minister’s Tight Leash: Exploring the Links Between Media, Minister and Agency Autonomy

There is a large public administration literature aiming to explain why agency autonomy varies both within and across jurisdictions. An important indicator of agency autonomy is the formal (legal) autonomy granted in law. Several studies have shown, however, that formal autonomy does not always equal de facto autonomy, and that the level of autonomy depends on a number of factors (Pollitt 2004; Verhoest et al. 2004; Yesilkagit and Van Thiel 2008). Some scholars have explained autonomy with sector (Bach and Jann 2010, Painter and Yee 2011; Verhoest 2010) and task (Pollit et al. 2004; Gilardi 2008; Lægreid and Rubecksen 2008). Others have focused on organizational features such as size (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Verhoest et al. 2010), geographical location (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Painter and Yee 2011; Bach and Jann 2010; Verhoest et al. 2004, Yesilkagit and Thiel 2008), and the multilevel (regional) structure (Lægreid et al. 2008). Several studies also include political saliency as an explanatory factor. Within salient sectors (and tasks), ministers monitor, control and intervene more intensely (Lewis 2012; Margetti and Verhoest 2014: 247; Pollitt 2006: 39; Ringquist, Worsham and Eisner 2003). The underlying mechanism is that politicians will be held accountable by the voters for the agencies’ mistakes, and ministers will therefor limit the autonomy of ‘salient’ agencies. Surprisingly, the literature on agency autonomy has not focused much on the impact of media. Ministers and public bureaucracies are increasingly subject to media scrutiny and public attention. Some scholars have shown how agencies are controlled by the media (Lægreid et al 2008), and that media function as ‘accountability forums’ since media coverage of regulatory agencies follows policy issues and the regulatory cycle (Maggetti 2011). We do not know, however, how media relates more directly to agency autonomy. When the minister is responsible for agency policies, and thus accountable to the public, media pressure and times of crisis and reputational threats might tempt ministers to increase control over agencies, in other words decrease their autonomy. Thus, in this paper we ask: how is agency autonomy affected by attention from media and the minister? To answer this question the paper draws on a 2016 survey to civil servants in Norwegian agencies. We draw on respondents’ perceptions of various aspects of autonomy, media pressure and minister attention, and relate this to other organizational features. The paper first reviews the literature on agency autonomy with a special emphasis on what might affect the level of autonomy. The research context, methods and data are then elaborated. The empirical analysis first looks at various aspects of agency autonomy, and then investigates what might explain this autonomy. The analysis shows that the level of attention from the minister affects agency autonomy. The agencies’ media appearance, on the other hand, does not affect their autonomy. Finally, we discuss our findings and the implications for the literature on agency autonomy.