Fichte’s Phenomenological Constructivism of External Rational Beings

Fichte constructs a conception of the self, which he calls the I, from a phenomenological description of subjective activity. From this starting point, Fichte phenomenologically constructs a possible external world and external rational beings in relations of natural right. This paper will argue that, despite a worrisome infinite regress, Fichte’s phenomenological construction of external rational beings in relations of natural right is in fact successful. Fichte declares in Foundations of Natural Right (2000 [1796]) that “the I is not something that has capacities, it is not a capacity at all, but rather is active; it is what it does, and when it does nothing it is nothing” (23). This declaration comes as a corollary to a brief but dense description of phenomenological activity, and a subtle distinction between the form and content of those experiences. The same point is made in the first “Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre” (1994 [1797-1800]), of roughly the same period. There, Fichte delineates three different types of “objects of consciousness” (1994 [1797-1800], 12): Objects of type [1] are simply chimeras – phantasms and fantasies generated by the mind itself. Objects of type [2] are objects of experience, phenomenally constructed and thus posterior to the I-as-subject. It is the third object, those of type [3], which is of exquisite importance for Fichte, his Wissenschaftslehre, and his phenomenological construction of rights. The object which exists necessarily, and yet which is determinable by the activity of the I and its willing, is the I itself (1994 [1797-1800], 13). Self-consciousness is the unity of the activity of the self as subject, with itself as object, such that “it should be considered as a subject-object” (1994 [1797-1800], 114). Fichte’s I-as-subject experiences itself as “a summons to the subject to exercise its free efficacy” (2000 [1796], 34). However, just as objects of type [1] are ultimately reproductions of experiences first experienced as external objects (i.e., of type [2]) so must the internal subject-object dyad have its origins in external objects (of something like type [2]). Therefore, Fichte I-as-subject needs to posit a new type of external object – type [4], which is reproduced and phenomenologically reconstructed as objects of type [3]. However, because [3] is free as an object determined to self-determine (2000 [1796], 31), [4] must also be an object with this same self-determining capacity: an external rational being. From [3] and [4], Fichte can generate a relation of natural right. Fichte, J. G. 1994 [1797-1800]. Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and other writings. Edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Fichte, J. G. 2000 [1796]. Foundations of natural right. Edited by Frederick Neuhauser. Translated by Michael Baur. New York: Cambridge University Press.