There has been relatively limited work within the policy process field that explores how policy actors choose to participate and how those participation decisions are influenced by context, particularly at the individual level. To better understand micro-level political behavior within the policy process, this paper focuses on one aspect of political behavior: targets of strategic action. The unit of observation is individuals, known as “policy actors”, who are already active in the policy process. Targets are the organizations who receive the strategic actions of policy actors. This paper explores individual-level decision making about which organizations to target to impact the policy process. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as well as game-theoretic models of strategic network formation, the research draws on surveys (n=450) and interviews (n=30) in Colorado in 2013, 2015, and 2017 regarding individual priorities within and perceptions of shale oil and gas exploration. Policy actors were asked towards whom they direct their activities and how important they perceived those interactions to be in achieving their professional goals.
There are very few applications within policy process studies that use longitudinal data to employ inferential network analysis. This research first describes a bipartite policy network and then explores variation in the desirability of connections and whether this variation can be attributed to differences in context using exponential random graph model (ERGM) analysis. Results indicate that in general, individuals are most likely to target governments, in comparison with industry or nonprofits, in their attempts to influence the policy process. There is also significant support for homophily: Individuals are more likely to engage with organizations that they perceive to be like-minded. Finally, there are correlations between an individual’s preference for level of government in regards to regulation and their perceived importance of a target organization. For example, individuals who prefer regulation at the local level tend to target organizations outside the public sector, such as environmental groups.
This research improves our understanding of the governance landscape of this highly-contested policy issue and contributes to both theory and practice. First, the findings inform expanded theory regarding micro-level political behavior, specifically in high-conflict policy issues. Second, the research contributes to ACF empirical work by illuminating how political behavior may vary based on the circumstances under which a policy actor finds himself. Third, in terms of practice, this research can be used by public sector individuals, nonprofit organizations, and private enterprise to better understand how their specific context may enable more effective participation in the policy process.
