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(Post)factual Responses to Wicked Problems: Trade-off Types in Complex Coordination Cases

Executives
Migration
Comparative Perspective
Decision Making
Eva G. Heidbreder
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Eva G. Heidbreder
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

Abstract

Proponents of evidence-based policy-making are increasingly challenged by perspectives coined as “post-truth” (Ralph Keyes) or “post-factual” (Angela Merkel) stressing the need for perceived or simply “felt” legitimacy – in contrast to functionally based “best” solutions. This paper addresses this increasing confrontation between “factual” versus “post-factual” policy-making: How can effective and legitimate collaboration in and by governments be achieved when wicked problems are at stake? In other words, how can complex policies with cross-national and cross-sectoral dimensions be coordinated in both a workable and democratically rightful manner? This paper develops a conceptual framework. First, core concepts are defined: wicked problems, collaboration, legitimacy and efficiency. Second, these core concepts are put into relation to each other. The goal is to discern general causal expectations about legitimate and efficient governmental collaboration, from policy-specific expectations for legitimate and effective coordination that hinge on policy-specific and context-dependent intervening variables. The paper starts by outlining the challenges that cross-country and cross-sectoral coordination creates for legitimate and efficient rule. In a nutshell, the argument put forward is that increased interdependence – as given in wicked problems – can be remedied by increased collaboration across sectors and states but that such policy responses undermine the established legitimation and accountability chains that pend on inner-sectoral control and inner-state democratic procedures. To underpin this expectation, we are investigating the recent governmental responses to the migration crisis in Germany and Norway. On the basis of this, we move a step further by theorising how different problem constellations in policies should evoke specific kinds of efficiency / legitimacy trade-offs. These depend on the policy tools and coordination necessary to solve a problem (efficiency demands) and the degree to which this breaks the institutionally established framework of policy-legitimisation in a field (legitimacy). Through these theoretical considerations combined with the empirical and cases-specific examination, the paper offers a typology of trade-off types (depending on coordination modes and legitimating procedures) to evoke a structured dialogue and more generalizable knowledge.