Representation and Bargaining in Informal Trilogues

The majority of EU legislative files is currently negotiated in so-called ‘trilogues’. Often depicted as informal and secluded settings, trilogues allow representatives of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to broker deals on new EU legislation so that the formal legislative process flows efficiently. Many existing studies have assessed the evolution of the rules of procedure governing trilogues, their overall legitimacy, or the variation in usage of trilogues for certain categories of files. Relatively little attention has been paid to the actual proceedings of trilogues, which is where this study seeks to contribute to the literature. This paper investigates the degree to which individual negotiators primarily represent their institution’s or their party group/member state’s interest, and how this representative orientation feeds into negotiation strategies and ultimately bargaining outcomes. While most of the literature on EU decision-making has focused on rational choice or sociological institutionalist explanations, this paper also uses grid-group cultural theory in order to capture the interaction styles employed by individual negotiators. Hence, this paper pays attention to both institutionalist explanations of the proceedings and outcomes of trilogue negotiations, but also systematically to the craftsmanship of political decision-making. This theoretical framework is tested on the recently concluded negotiations of the EU’s 4th Railway Package. With 6 legislative files in the package, ordered in two clusters of 3 files each, and rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs representing no less than 7 political groups, this has been one of the most complex legislative packages negotiated over the past years. Hence this case displays a large variance that can be explained.