Stretching, or Violating the Czech Constitution: Is the Direct Election to Blame?

The paper carries out an in-depth qualitative analysis of numerous cases in which the first directly elected president, Mr. Zeman, got into a conflict with other constitutional and political actors, who accused Mr. Zeman of stretching or even violating the constitution. The paper shall not seek to resolve the question of whether Mr. Zeman did violate the constitution, as this is a complex issue which is left to constitutional lawyers. However, it is beyond doubt that Mr. Zeman violated several constitutional conventions and his steps and policies clashed frequently with other constitutional bodies, notably cabinet (Baylis 1996). The aim of the paper is to determine whether these conflicts can be traced to the direct election of the president which was introduced in 2012. The analysis comes from the classic assumption on divergence between constitutional texts and constitutional practices (Loewenstein 1949; Duverger 1980). This divergence is analyzed from the perspective of structure of political opportunities (e.g. Tavits 2009) that frames the paper in theoretical terms. The results of the paper are mixed. Some conflicts can be clearly explained by the mode of elections, especially during the first months of Zeman’s presidency, when Mr. Zeman enjoyed so-called “legitimacy advantage” (Protsyk 2005), whereas other conflicts can be attributed to a set of other factors. This case study is a contribution to discussions on the impact of the mode of presidential election on actual constitutional practice in countries with (formal or real) dual executive.