How Institutions Define their Reports: The Cases of French Economic, Social and Environmental Council and the Court of Accounts

Both the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (Conseil économique, social et environnemental), which is a parliament of organized civil society (whose members are trade-unionists, entrepreneurs, environmentalists chosen by their organization or eminent personnalities appointed by the Government), and the Court of Accounts (Cour des comptes), bureaucratic organization in charge of auditing the public funds and evaluating public policies, are dedicated to production of reports. Various actors (such as civil servants, politicians, journalists) use these reports, so that they stimulate the national public debate. However, beyond the functions and practices enshrined in the law, both institutions have to impact the reception by the various publics, and to convince them about the influence of these reports. Besides, they always have to show that their findings and proposals are legitimate. Since they only have the power of speech and are sometimes criticized about their inefficiency or bias, it is extremely important for these institutions to give sense to these reports, through a metadiscourse. The Paper will aim to establish a comparison between the presentations of self and editorial policies of the two institutions. It will be based on the study of the reports, official speeches given by the institutional authorities (President or ‘Premier Président’), interviews and in situ observations. Based on a sociology of institutions, it will focus on the constraints on the actors in defining their roles (top civil servants in the case of the Court of Accounts, representatives of organized civil society at the Economic, Social and Environmental Council) and struggles within institutions. For example, at the ESEC, two visions of the report are opposed. According to some actors, the added value of the report should be based on ‘talking’: the simple virtue of discussion leads to consensus. According to other members of the Council, it needs ‘saying’, i.e. making concrete and strong recommendations to policy makers. During the debates, these two conceptions of the institution may prove contradictory. The social identity of the actors is actually at stake. The officials of the Court of Accounts must show neutrality and loyalty, whereas they have to evaluate public policies. At the ESEC, representatives must reconcile the traditional image of their organization (a trade-union, for example) and their willingness to negotiate. Finally, the relationship between the editorial policies of the institutions and the actual or supposed influence of their reports will be discussed. The ESEC is often presented by journalists or politicians as a weak institution with unattractive reports, while the Court of Accounts is highly popular. The Paper intends to show the institutional work that underlies the life of public reports, from the production to the reception.