By Edoardo Ongaro, Fabrizio Di Mascio, Davide Galli, Alessandro Natalini and Francesco Stolfi
A growing stream of literature is addressing the issue of the multiple impacts of the crises (banking, economic, fiscal) on public administration and governance, although it has so far remained at the hypothesis formulation stage. This paper moves beyond this stage by investigating how decision processes have unfolded in Italy, a country hit not only by the economic and fiscal crises but also by a political one, epitomised by the replacement at the end of 2011 of a ‘political’ government by the ‘technical’ government chaired by Professor Mario Monti. Furthermore, like the other euro-zone countries affected by the fiscal crisis, Italy has been the object of direct intervention on the part of EU bodies, which have gone beyond their previous advisory role (indicating general macro-economic and budgetary goals) to dictate specific reforms. Hence, the Italian case allows to assess the domestic impact of this interventionist turn in European governance.
The period observed spans 2007-2012. The paper focuses on the decisions regarding the configuration of the public sector. Two areas have been selected for investigation: the “spending review”, i.e. the management of the state budget; and an institutional reform, namely the restructure of provincial governments .
Our preliminary findings suggest a prevalence of continuity over reform even in the face of the many exogenous pressures for change. The durable influence of previous reforms and of long-term features of the Italian political and administrative system seems to have hampered attempts to move away from the status quo. However, the opening of opportunities for change may have been created by government alternation (in its ideological, ideational, attitudinal, and political-technical dimensions).
