Why do states fight if conflict is a costly and inefficient endeavor? Bargaining theories of war identify uncertainty and asymmetric information as a critical cause of conflict. In a nutshell, if rational leaders are uncertain about their opponent’s military strength, preferences, or resolve, they may miscalculate the expected costs and outcomes of fighting which increases the risk of bargaining breakdown and war. I argue that international communication and resource flow networks (e.g. diplomatic exchanges, alliances, arms transfers) play a critical role in shaping conflict dynamics in situations in which fighting results from informational problems. Specifically, network relationships among states can serve as a non-battlefield-based channel for conveying strategic information which rational leaders can use to arrive at better estimates of the expected costs and outcomes of war. This in turn reduces uncertainty and information asymmetry and facilitates peaceful settlement of confrontations. Thus, we should expect states’ positions in networks to be an important predictor of the probability of international conflict. I derive several hypotheses from this general argument that link the network positions of individual states and dyads to the probability of war and conflict onset. I test these hypotheses using data on militarized interstate disputes and wars in the period from 1950 to 2000 and temporal exponential random graph models.
