Judging under Constraint: Formal Independence and Strategic Behavior of the Caribbean Court of Justice

There is increasing recognition that international courts (ICs) are constrained by competing incentives. For example, an IC’s interests to maintaining a positive reputation with stakeholders may conflict with interests to stay in the good favor of states. This environment of competing interests creates incentives for ICs to adopt strategic behavior. What factors determine the nature of political constraints faced by ICs and how they adapt to these constraints remains a puzzle. This paper aims to address this puzzle of how ICs judge under constraint. Specifically, it asks: how do ICs strategically behave and what factors shape that behavior? This paper argues that the institutional design of international courts shapes the strategic behaviors ICs develop. It considers how formal judicial independence affects judicial behavior. I argue that ICs with weaker safeguards of independence will be more likely to develop three types of strategic behavior: judicial restraint, persuasion and communicative action, and the mobilization of constituencies than their counterparts with greater independence. This paper empirically analyses the relationship between independence and strategic behavior of the Caribbean Court of Justice.