Justice and Legitimacy in Realist Political Theory

Realist approaches in political theory are distinguished by attempts to reconceive the role of two notions that have been central in much political philosophy: legitimacy, and justice. While such reconceptions can take various forms, most versions of realism offer arguments seek (1) to substantially diminish the importance of justice within normative political theory, (2) to emphasize legitimacy as the far more important criterion in normative assessment, and (3) to provide a distinctively realist account of legitimacy. My paper explores some of the complexities involved in such a three-pronged strategy. First, I point to some of the general challenges facing any effort to make a sharp distinction between justice and legitimacy, and I indicate how these challenges take particular shape for realists. Second, I discuss the worry that realist approaches threaten a kind of schizophrenia for realists who want also to be engaged political agents: the problem, in short, concerns their approach to specific matters of justice within the particular polity they inhabit. Finally, I raise the question whether realist approaches provide a distinct account of legitimacy, or instead constitute accounts that either downplay the ideal of legitimacy or substantially revise what legitimacy has meant within normative political theory.