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Patterns of Coalition-Opposition Cooperation in the Netherlands

Comparative Politics
Government
Parliaments
Political Parties
Simon Otjes
Departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Universiteit Leiden
Tom Louwerse
Departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Universiteit Leiden
Simon Otjes
Departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Universiteit Leiden

Abstract

Research on the parliamentary behaviour of parties and individual members of parliament (MPs) shows that the division between government and opposition parties has a large impact on how parliaments function (Hix and Noury 2011; Louwerse 2011; Otjes 2011; Laver 2006). While hardly any formal rules distinguish between governing and opposition parties, parliamentary practice in parliamentary systems is dominated by an informal divide between those MPs that support the government and those that oppose it. Government parties vote alike and work together in sponsoring legislative motions and amendments. While we know that it matters, relatively little is know about under what conditions the division between government and opposition matters more or less. This paper explores the extent to which and under what conditions coalition and opposition vote differently. We identify three explanations that relate to the government itself: a) the type of government: minimal winning, oversized or (supported) minority cabinets. b) policy position (extremism) of the government: does the government consist of mainly rightwing or leftwing parties or is it more centrist, and c) caretaker status: if the government only attends to current affairs, it is likely that parliamentary voting behaviour is less politicized in government-opposition terms. In addition, we identify four properties of the proposal under consideration that could affect the government-opposition divide: d) the extremity of the proposal under consideration, e) the issue area of the proposal under consideration, f) the type of proposal: laws, amendments or motions, and g) the sponsor: opposition MPs, government MPs or both. The paper examines parliamentary voting in the Netherlands between 1994 and 2012. This case offers considerable variation on the government-level variables as well as the proposal-level variables. We find that government-opposition voting is generally high, but varies based on the policy position of the government and the properties of the proposal.