The Impact of the European Level of Government on the Politics of Secession

The main goal of this paper is to explain the dynamics of a conflict over autonomy within the European Union. We address the question how the European level of government may affect the politics of secession at the national and sub-state level. First we address theoretical questions about the relevant levels of sovereignty in a multi-level authority system. Then, building on a game theoretic foundation we consider the central and sub-state elites strategic choices in a game-theoretical model. We design a “self-determination” game, which explains the possibilities of equilibria and political stability in the chosen case-study – the Spanish “State of Autonomies”. We find that under the institutional conditions in the years 2012-2015 the outcome of the game is “status quo” (SQ). However, if the Catalan sub-unit would be able to engage the EU it could improve its payoff and get its first-order preference “referendum” (R).