Terrain and distance – in brevity physical geography – have been considered as important factors of military operations. It is no coincidence that classical and neoclassical geopoliticians have stressed constrains imposed by geography on power projection capabilities of states (including great powers). Nevertheless, last decades have witnessed a remarkable technological advancement. So-called Revolution in Military Affairs is just one reflection of this rapid technological change. Logical question remains, whether all the technological developments within military realm have altered the significance of distance, terrain and other geographical features which have traditionally affected competing armies. If the response is affirmative (in the sense that physical geography has lost its significance in warfare), then (especially) partisans of neoclassical geopolitics should critically reconsider fundamental assumptions about the influence of geography upon behavior of states and similar units. On the other hand, if geography has retained its significance, many widely circulating arguments about death of geography as a factor in military competition should be rejected.
An interesting observation is that there is scarcity of papers or books explicitly dealing with the issue. For sure, there is (among others) Colin Gray and Patrick Porter dealing with the subject at the strategic level. Nevertheless, at the tactical and operational level, the gap in our systemic knowledge is much bigger. In addition, there is very limited number of publications explicitly and systematically comparing role of space and terrain across last century or two. In a stark contrast to the fore mentioned lack of systemic works on the subject, there is a widely shared belief that modern technology has almost eliminated role of geography as an important factor in military operations.
Attempting to fill this gap, the (proposed) paper tries to analyze the influence of technological development on the use of space in war(fare). The key goal is to analyze military use of (physical) space on the tactical and operational level by competing armies. The empirical section compares and analyses four carefully selected cases of mid to high intensity conflicts (military operations) with regards to use of space by engaged armies. These operations stretch over the last 150 years, thus enabling to analyze the influence of changing technology on behavior of engaged armies.
The main result is that while technological developments have potentially enhanced ability to overcome geographical obstacles, this result holds only if an enemy is tactically incompetent. However, if an enemy is competent, geography has in many aspects increased its influence upon tactical and operations behavior of opposing forces. Broader implication is that the reason why geography have seemed irrelevant is not technology per se, but rather that western armies have been lucky to fight non-competent adversaries. Speaking from a broader perspective, while neoclassical geopolitical approach is in need of theoretical advancement, it is not its emphasis on geography which calls for rapid innovation.
