Informing the Information Regulators - An Analysis of Information Exchanges between EU Agencies and National Administrations

EU agencies gather and prepare information, propose common indicators and standards, and create regulatory drafts that subsequently influence directives and regulations by other EU institutions. In their policy fields, their work is the first informational input into the EU’s policy process. For delivering information and expertise, EU agencies rely on national administrators who are also omnipresent in their administrative boards and working groups. Here, national administrators are able to shape contents and recommendations of EU agencies via the provision of national information. More than that, when EU agencies fail to build a viable information exchange culture with national administrators, they are unable to operate effectively. The literature on (EU) agencies observes two trends: On the one hand, EU agencies promote centralization in the European Administrative Space whereby the European Commission gains greater influence on a policy field via its representation in EU agencies and its outreach to national agencies via EU agencies’ networks. But on the other hand, national agencies appear to increase their policy autonomy via their participation in EU networks and especially in EU agencies. My paper investigates this multi-level process and asks how EU agencies shape and manage these information exchanges with national administrations. It serves two objectives: First, it maps the different processes via which EU agencies gain information from national administrations. And second, it traces the discretion of national administrators in the provision of information. The comparative case study design adopted in this paper accounts both for an agency’s degree of formal independence and its primary tasks, covering the whole variance of EU agency types. First, interactions of an EU agency with other actors occur within its legal framework that specify its formal independence. Thus, formal independence of an EU agency from other EU institutions is a central dimension in analysing EU agencies’ information processes. Second, an EU agency’s main task (preparation of data and information or drafting of regulations) influences the structure of information processes. The paper conducts four qualitative case studies in four different EU agencies (the European Environment Agency, European Medicines Agency, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and European Securities and Markets Authority), tracing how EU agencies obtain and process information from and with national administrators. The empirical analysis draws on document data as well as thirty triangulated expert interviews. The results indicate that agencies with high formal independence from EU institutions face stricter time requirements and give a greater say to national administrators in their multi-level interactions than agencies with low formal independence. This indicates that higher independence from EU institutions does not necessarily lead to greater ownership of the content and results of an EU agency’s work. Rather, more independent EU agencies show a greater reliance on national administrators. On the other hand, lower independence from EU institutions appears to reduce the influence of national administrators on the policy outcome of an EU agency.